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Changing Contexts, Steady Flows: Patterns of Institutional Change within
the Communal Irrigation Systems (Kuhls) of Kangra Valley, Himachal
Pradesh, India

Mark Baker
University of North Carolina, Asheville
Introduction

Throughout the world large scale demographic,
political and economic changes have transformed
relations among rural land users and between them and
the natural resources they use and manage. Pervasive
changes include the expansion of markets and monetized
exchange relations into hinterland areas, the increasing
assertion of state claims to control and regulate natural
resources which were, in many cases, previously under
some sort of local jurisdiction, demographic shifts in
population densities and growth rates, and emerging
participatory political systems. The redistribution of
power, access, control, and ability to exclude that these
processes entail has produced myriad forms of conflict
among rural land users and between them and various of
state entities. The ensuing fault lines of conflict range
in scale from gender-based intrahousehold negotiation
and contestation (Schroeder 1993, Carney 1993) to
competition for resource access and control between
peasant groups differentiated by economic interests, kin
alliances, class and ethnicity (Ensminger and Rutten
1991) to conflicts and alliances between peasant groups
and state agencies (Moore 1993, Neumann 1992, Peluso
1992).
Local institutions that regulate the provision,
distribution and utilization of common resources
constitute a mid-level site on which the multiple
tensions accompanying large scale political and
economic change manifest themselves. One particularly
common form of economic change is the expansion of
monetized market exchange relations into areas where
previously they did not exist or where they existed in
muted forms only. Market expansion generally
increases the economic differentiation within an area as
some individuals take advantage of new economic
opportunities while others do not. The lines of
differentiation often follow preexisting axes of
inequality such as gender, caste, class, ethnicity and/or
wealth.
Increasing market-based economic
opportunities generate tensions within institutions
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which manage common resources because they
differentially reduce the dependence on and hence value
of the resource for those who have access to new
economic opportunities. Polanyi (1944) and Jodha
(1985) have shown that these tensions erode common
property resource institutions by weakening individuals'
dependence on the benefits the resource provides.
Polanyi and Jodha suggest that as increasing reliance on
outside income reduces dependence on local resource
systems, then institutions for managing those systems
will lose support.
While this formulation is true in a general sense, it
does not capture the remarkable diversity of impacts of,
and responses to, increasing nonfarm employment
observable among the gravity flow irrigation systems
(kuhls) in Kangra Valley, Himachal Pradesh. Two axes
of differentiation help to identify variation in response
among kuhl regimes .1 The first is the degree of role
specialization and organizational formalization of the
kuhl regime and the second is the extent of state
involvement in kuhl management. The degree of role
specialization and formalization ranges from informal
kuhl regimes with no specialized roles or formal rules,
to highly specialized and formalized kuhl regimes with
multiple watermasters, a formal kuhl committee with
1 By kuhl regime I mean the complex of physical
structures which comprise a kuhl and the social
relations and institutional arrangements necessary for its
construction, repair and maintenance. In addition to
pressures associated with political economic changes,
kuhls are also subject to recurring environmental
shocks, i.e. floods, earthquakes and drought, which
threaten the ability of kuhl regimes to maintain their
integrity. For an analysis of the interconnectedness of
kuhls and of how inter-kuhl networks reduce the risks of
environmental dependence see Baker, J.M. (1995)
"Irrigation Networks in the Western Himalayas:
Methodological and Conceptual Implications for Public
Administration Theory."
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elected officers, extensive written records and
sophisticated methods for measuring water flow.
Similarly, state involvement in kuhl management
varies greatly, from minimal degrees of involvement in
some kuhl regimes to the entire management of others.
In this paper, based on fieldwork among the 39
kuhls which divert water from the Neugal River just
west of the town of Pal am pur in Kangra Valley, I argue
that the variations among kuhls in their degree of
formalization and the extent of state involvement can be
explained by examining the specific configurations of
social relations and ecological conditions which
characterize each kuhl regime. I show how the
particular combination of social relations and ecological
conditions within a kuhl system shape the tensions
arising from increasing nonfarm employment as well as
the means people employ to resolve those tensions.
Furthermore, I argue that the varied roles the state of
Himachal Pradesh plays in the management of different
kuhls results from negotiations between various state
agents and the persons involved in kuhl management.
This negotiation, and the outcomes in degree of state
involvement in water management, are shaped by local
social and ecological influences rather than by the
blanket application of a homogenous "policy" across a
socially and ecologically differentiated landscape.
The topography of Kangra Valley, a series of gently
sloping alluvial fans spreading outwards from the base
of the Dhaula Dhar mountains, creates opportunities for
irrigated agriculture at a scale unusual in the Himalaya.
Each alluvial fan in the valley is bisected longitudinally
by a stream or river originating in the Dhaula Dhar.
From their narrow headwater canyons to their
disappearance into the erosive canyons of the Sivalik
Hills ten to twelve kilometers to the south, they each
supply water to as many as forty or fifty different
aravity flow irrigation systems. These irrigation
~ystems consist of a diversion structure, a main channel
ranging in length from less than one kilometer to more
than 40 kilometers, numerous secondary and tertiary
channels and hundreds of named distribution points.
The initial construction of the longest and most
complex kuhls was occasionally sponsored by precolonial local rulers. However the majority of the
kuhls in Kangra Valley were constructed without state
patronage either by local elites or collectivities of
farmers. By the beginning of British colonial rule in
Kangra in 1850, responsibility for managing and
repairing each kuhl rested with the cultivators of the
land the kuhl irrigated (Coward 1990). Approximately
715 major kuhls and more than 2500 minor kuhls
irrigate more than 30 ,000 hectares in the valley.
The areas irrigated by kuhls differ tremendously in
agricultural productivity, the availability of irrigation
water from post-monsoon annual streams, and the social
relations among irrigators. Some kuhls irrigate only
highly productive rice and wheat growing fields located
near the perennial streams flowing from the Dhaula
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Dhar. Other kuhls, after traversing the fertile riverine
terraces, transport water several kilometers and deliver it
to the less fertile agricultural areas on the ridges and
plateau tops above the perennial streams. In some areas
local annual streams which flow after the onset of the
monsoon reduce an irrigator 1s reliance on water
transported from the more distant perennial rivers. The
irrigators of kuhls may be relatively homogeneous or
considerably different in caste and wealth distribution.
Differences can be exacerbated when upper caste farmers
cultivate the headend areas of a kuhl 1s command area and
lower caste farmers cultivate tailend areas.

Local Determinants of the Effects of
Environmental Change
The diverse social and ecological contexts of the
kuhls of Kangra Valley provide a rich arena in which to
examine the conflicts which arise when economic
change alters shared dependence on a common resource.
Agriculture in the area remains primarily oriented to
subsistence grain production. However, a rapidly
expanding nonfarm employment sector has provided
unprecedented opportunities for (mostly male) off-farm
employment. For example, in the Neugal River basin
at the base of the Dhaula Dhar range, between 1961 and
1991 the numbers of males engaged in full-time
nonfarm employment more than tripled, while those
engaged in full-time agricultural work remained about
the same.2 Households which draw income from
nonfarm employment now have less incentive to
contribute the labor necessary for kuhl maintenance and
repair, and to comply with rules regulating the control
of, access to and use of irrigation water, than
households without nonfarm employment income.
The disincentive to contribute labor and/or money
for kuhl maintenance and repair is also influenced by the
potential for conflict among a kuhl's irrigat~r~ and ~he
use value of the water a kuhl delivers. The dismcentive
is greatest either when a kuhl irrigates primarily low
value crops for which alternative post-monsoon water
supplies are available, or when caste, .class or
locationally derived inequalities generate conflict among
farmers. The disincentive to contribute towards the
provision of irrigation water is least when the kuhl
irrigates high value crops and when inequalities among
irrigators are minimal. Furthermore, the s~~e loc~l
factors which influence disincentives to participate m
kuhl management also affect the degree of regime
formalization, if any, and the extent of state
2 This information comes from the Riwaj-i-Abpashi
(Book of Irrigation Customs) compiled as part of the
1915 settlement of District Kangra. A major kuhl has a
perennial water source and irrigates n:o .or more .
villages. The Himachal Pradesh Statistical Outhne
(1990:58) notes that in 1988, of the 32,511 hectares of
irrigated land in the district, 30,895 were irrigated by
kuhls and lift irrigation systems and 1 ,616 hectares were
irrigated by wells and tube wells.
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intervention in kuhl management. Ten of the thirtynine kuhls within the Neugal basin deliver water to
high value crops and have irrigators who are ~ot divided
by class or caste differences. These kuhls are mformally
organized with no watermaster and are managed
independently of any state involvement. At the other
end of the extreme are kuhls which deliver water to low
value crops and whose irrigators are divided by class or
caste inequalities. For these kuhl regimes the stresses
predicted by Polanyi and Jodha were so great .tha~ th~y
collapsed and the kuhls literally stopped functwnmg m
the late 1960's and early 1970's. The panchayats
included within the command area of each of these
defunct kuhls negotiated with the Himachal Pradesh
Irrigation and Public Health Department (IPH) for the
department to assume responsibility for the
management of these kuhls under the Himachal Pradesh
Minor Canals Act. As a result, nine of the thirty-nine
kuhls within the Neugal basin are presently managed by
the IPH Department. The willingness of the IPH
Department to assume management responsibility for
defunct kuhls, and of other state agencies and
departments to subsidize the repair of other kuhls, has
helped preserve the overall viability of the kuhl
networks within the Neugal basin. The various reasons
for the willingness of these state agencies to subsidize
irrigation management are grounded in the ideology of
the developmentalist socialist welfare state.
Instrumentalist motivations within the IPH Department
include increasing the department's power relative to
other departments, and justifying an expanding budget.
A less direct motivation which drives the giving of
subsidies for kuhl repair by the civil administration and,
on occasion, grants brokered by a local Member of the
Legislative Assembly (MLA), is the expectation of
political support in return for financial subsidies. The
remaining twenty of the thirty-nine kuhls irrigate
mostly high value crops whose cultivators are
characterized by various inequalities. Increasing
nonfarm employment has weakened the social basis for
cooperation within these kuhl regimes, thereby
allowing differences rooted in caste, land ownership and
position within the kuhl's command area, to manifest as
conflicts within various arenas of kuhl management. In
response to conflict, the members of these kuhl regimes
have formalized their manner of self-organization by
creating elected kuhl committees, formalizing
previously informal rules governing the distribution of
responsibility for kuhl repair and maintenance,
instigating and enforcing fines and other sanctions for
those who violate rules, and in one case substituting
monetary for labor contributions for kuhl maintenance
and repair.
I turn now to a brief review of the effects of
increasing nonfarm employment on these kuhls. By
using brief vignettes I will show how particular
intersections of social and environmental characteristics
influence the tensions resulting from increased nonfarm
employment, such as declining participation in kuhl
maintenance work parties, shifts in the burden of
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responsibility for kuhl maintenance from headend to
tail end farmers, and the declining authority of the
watermaster.

Declining Participation
Without exception, kohlis, the local pahari term for
watermaster, cited mobilizing farmers for kuhl
maintenance as their most difficult problem. 3 In 1991,
due to low farmer turn-out on the appointed work days,
Shri Laxman Das, the kohli for Kathul Kuhl, could
neither complete the annual cleaning of the kuhl nor
reconstruct the diversion structure. That year no
irrigation was possible prior to the monsoon.
Similarly, in 1988 because so few farmers turned out to
clean and repair Raniya Kuhl, the kohli, Shri Kishori
Lal, dismissed the work party and instead hired migrant
laborers from Rajasthan to do the work.4 Attendance
registers for Pathan Kuhl also show that the number of
farmers participating in kuhl maintenance has declined
in recent years. 5

3 Of the thirty non-government managed kuhls in the
Neugal basin, twenty have kohlis. The kohli is
.
responsible for mobilizing the communal work parties
necessary for maintaining and repairing the kuhl, for
performing the religious ceremonies associated with
kuhl management, for supervising the transport and
distribution of water in the kuhl, and for resolving
conflicts between farmers regarding water use. Twelve
kohlis have begun to keep attendance registers in which
they note who was present and who was absent when
work parties are organized. While all attendance
registers record who contributes labor and who does not,
the dynamics of declining participation and hence the
function of the attendance register vary from kuhl to
kuhl. Participation in the annual communal work
parties to clean the kuhl and reconstruct the diversion
structure may decline for political or economic reasons
among big or small landowners. In some kuhls
participation may have been low previously, while in
others low participation may be a recent phenomenon.
As the reasons for declining participation vary, so does
the purpose, meaning and effectiveness of the attendance
register.
4 Shri Kishori Lal reported that only ten years ago
eighty to one hundred men would show up for the four
days required to clean and repair Raniya Kuhl. In 1993
only 21 individuals, mostly young boys or elderly men,
came.

5 Between 1978 and 1991 the maximum number of

participating farmers on a given day declined from
between 90 and 100 to between 30 and 40. And the
total number of persondays contributed per year also
declined during this period. The kohli for Pathan Kuhl,
Shri Dhyan Singh confirmed this trend by stating that
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The reasons for the decline in participation in
Raniya, Path an and Kathul Kuhls vary. Declining
dependence on kuhl water with a low end use value
accounts for reduced participation in Kathul Kuhl. The
"pull'' of nonfarm employment opportunities accounts
for declining participation in Pathan Kuhl even though
tt delivers water with a high end use value. Although
Raniya Kuhl also delivers water to high value crops, its
irrigators are divided by caste and land based inequality
and conflict. Low caste small landholders leaving
Raniya Kuhl to escape these inequalities account for
declining participation rates in this kuhl. Declining
participation, while a common phenomenon, has
different causes and effects.

Distribution of Responsibility for System
Maintenance
The burden of kuhl maintenance has always fallen
more heavily on downstream irrigators. Customary
rules for allocating responsibility for kuhl maintenance
and repair between head- and tailenders simultaneously
acknowledge this tendency and attempt to mitigate it.
The declining dependence on agriculture and the
consequent weakening of intetdependence among
households has reduced the leverage that downstream
users have on headenders for system maintenance. This
is especially true when caste differences intersect with
locationally derived inequalities.
Buhli Kuhl exemplifies this point. The seventeen
hamlets Buhli Kuhl irrigates are Rajput-dominated at
the head of the kuhl, and are primarily lower caste at the
tail end. Due to the caste bias of participation in
nonfarm employment, upstream Rajputs became
proportionately less dependent on kuhl water than the
downstream, lower caste, households. Upstream Rajput
contributions to kuhl maintenance and repair declined,
leading downstream lower caste hamlets to withdraw
from the kuhl. Residents of these hamlets now must
sow paddy using the less productive dry-seed broadcast
method instead of the more productive but waterintensive sprouted-seed broadcast method, and they must
depend on timely rains for irrigation.

Declining Kohli Authority
The inability of the kohli of Buhli Kuhl to enforce
rules governing the distribution of the burden of kuhl
maintenance and repair among farmers reflects the
general erosion of the kohli's authority. The basis of
the kohli's authority and the legitimacy for rules
governing kuhl management was common dependence
on kuhl water. The fragmentation of this dependence,
although moderated by ideologically compelling norms
of reciprocity and hierarchical relations, nevertheless
weakens the legitimacy of rules and the ability of
village based authorities to enforce them.
declining farmer participation for kuhl maintenance and
repair was his biggest headache.
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Previously the position of kohli carried respect and
prestige. When the demand for kuhl water peaked for
paddy sowing and water supply was at its annual
minimum, the kohli walked his kuhl overseeing water
distribution and resolving water conflicts on the spot.
His long turban and cane were adequate reminders of his
authority and helped ensure that his word held. Now the
hereditary right to be kohli, in some cases, is a liability
rather than a privilege. Many current kohlis state that
they would prefer their sons to get nonfarm jobs and not
assume the responsibilities associated with the
relatively thankless, difficult and poorly remunerated job
of kohli.

Kuhl Regime Responses to Environmental
Change
Kuhl regimes have responded to stresses by
instituting changes at the operating and institutional
levels (Ciriacy-Wantrup 1969). Responses at the
operating level include changes in the remuneration for
the kohli, the mobilization of resources for kuhl
maintenance and repair, and the formality of kuhl
management activities. Responses at the institutional
level include the formation of kuhl committees, with
their varied structures, functions, and degrees of
effectiveness. The combination of responses among
different kuhl regimes reflects each regime's particular
set of social and ecological characteristics rather than a
common response to shared tensions and conflicts. For
example, although kuhl committees are structurally
similar, some were formed to address increasing internal
conflict while others were primarily formed to negotiate
with the state.

Kuhl Committees
In 1993, there were fourteen kuhl committees within
the Neugal basin. Local officers of the Punjab State
Government organized two of the earliest kuhl
committees in the early 1950's as part of a more general
effort to form Agricultural Cooperative Societies.
These two initial "cooperative irrigation societies"
constituted the blueprint for subsequent kuhl
committees, though the irrigators themselves rather
than government officers created the later committees.
Kuhl committees were formed for three reasons. The
most common reason was to strengthen the declining
authority of the kohli to enforce rules and mobilize
labor.
A second reason was to facilitate the
negotiations with the various agents of the state
necessary to acquire monetary support for kuhl system
repair and maintenance. The last reason is to defend the
kuhl regime members' water claims against an external
threat. For example, the shareholders of Bhradi Kuhl
organized a committee to challenge in court the IPH
Department's proposed construction of an upstream kuhl
which would threaten their water supply: they were
successful. Evolving RulesKuhl committees provide a
forum for the creation and modification of rules. The
effectiveness of rules varies according to the nature and
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degree of conflict within the kuhl regime. Three
examples of changes in the operating rules of kuhls are
the creation of fine systems, the substitution of money
in lieu of labor for kuhl maintenance and repair, and
increases in the remuneration rates for kohlis. Every
kuhl regime that maintains attendance records has
developed a system for fining households which do not
contribute labor for kuhl maintenance. For example the
committee for Pangwan Kuhl, whose irrigators are
mostly all Rajput farmers with relatively similar
landholdings, levies and collects a fine, and gives a
receipt, for every six or seven days of absence. On the
other hand, for Raniya Kuhl, which is divided by caste
conflict and wealth inequalities and a committee
controlled by a few large landowning families, the
kohli, Shri Kishori Lal, neither maintains accurate
attendance records nor even attempts to collect fines.
The fine system in Samruhl Kuhl led to women from
female-headed households participating in communal
work parties. This violated the prescription against
female participation in any communal aspect of kuhl
management. In response, the kuhl committee and
irrigators of the kuhl substituted a monetary fee based
on the area a household cultivates in lieu of labor
contributions. The specific configuration of social
relations among the irrigators of a kuhl has shaped the
meaning and effectiveness of structurally similar
changes. Some examples: the committee for Raniya
Kuhl was a means (albeit not terribly successful) for
local elites to maintain their threatened hierarchical
authority; for Samruhl Kuhl the structurally identical
committee was the vehicle for shifting from labor to
monetary contributions for kuhl maintenance and repair;
and the fine system of the Pangwan Kuhl committee
effectively mitigated against the pull of nonfarm
employment.

Conclusion
The title of this paper, "Changing Contexts, Steady
Flows," suggests that although the unprecedented
expansion of nonfarm employment opportunities has
transformed the context of irrigation in Kangra, water
continues to flow through the kuhl channels as it has
done for the last several hundred years. This paper has
conveyed an idea of the transformations in the
organization of irrigation management, and in the mix
of local/state authority for irrigation management,
which has been necessary in order to achieve this
constancy of flow. And it has shown how local level
factors shape the effects of environmental change, the
trajectory of response to those effects, and the extent of
state involvement in kuhl management.
At the basin level increasing nonfarm employment
opportunities initiated a sequence of responses that
produced new patterns of authority and organization for
water management. These differential patterns of
change within individual kuhls created a web of multijurisdictional, interconnected kuhl networks that would
appear highly resilient at the basin level, because each
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kuhl finds its own equilibrium mix of state and local
authority and management structure for a particular type
and rate of contextual change and its own configuration
of social and ecological characteristics. The existing
basin level pattern of authority and organization for
water management suggests that while specific
organizational forms, operations, and scales of regime
management did not persist unchanged, the overall
pattern of kuhl networks within the basin transformed
in order to endure.
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